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Abstract. Th e article deals with semiosis and its dimensions as a theoretical construct 
to show some elementary diff erences between spheres of semiotic activity. In essence, 
one sign will be dissected into four categories of existence to show it may have diff erent 
relations depending on the dimension it happens to be in. Th e general framework is 
that of human consciousness and its two distinct states: awake cognition and asleep 
dreaming with emphasis on the latter. From our point of view, the concepts of ‘nature’ 
and ‘culture’ have two layers: the manifest form and the latent function, the seen and 
the unseen. Th ese are used as parallels to support the central thesis of this article that 
human cognition has dreaming as its countepart.
Th e main theoretical frame is drawn from the work of Greimas and Courtés with 
emphasis on the semiotic square. Th e concept of the sign is taken from Peirce, whereas 
‘sign-ness’ is adopted from Pyatigorskij. By projecting the triadic sign onto the semiotic 
square and excluding the concept ‘sign system’ along with the syntactic aspect, the basic 
fourfold dimension of the sign as such will be brought to view based on the distinct 
sign-relations in each given dimension. In order to double the square, semiosis will be 
endowed with features of ‘being-able’, thus aff ording the initial expression of dominant 
modalities serving as basis for the structure(s) of the elementary function and mechanism 
in each of the four dimensions. Th is will also enable bringing into view some elementary 
restrictions on semiosis in each dimension. Lastly, some new terms are suggested in 
accordance with what has been presented.
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Introduction
“Semiosis is that operation which, by setting up a relationship of reciprocal 
presupposition between the expression form and the content form – or the signifi er 
and signifi ed – produces signs. [...] By semiosis can also be meant the semic category 
of which two constituent terms are the expression form and the content form (or, 
signifi er and signifi ed).” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285)
Semiosis produces signs, enabling the generation of meaning. Th is says very little, and 
oft en enough semiosis is treated either as a (thought) process or as a function in nature 
and/or culture; the inevitable outcomes of which – meanings – are the sole part known 
to the interpretant in an infi nite series of interpretata1. Th is is the case in the sphere of 
consciousness in a state facilitating a suitable structure for cognitive mentation to “take 
place”, and therefore I will not touch the subject of semiosis from any other viewpoint. 
Also, sign-function is excluded from the fi rst half of this paper in order to delve into 
the four most elementary spaces known to us for potential semioses. In order to taper 
towards a single semiostasis, its diff erent dimensions, and to exclude the systematicity 
or infi nite continuance of semiosis, I adopt Pyatigorskij’s view in that semiotics, instead 
of emphasizing the ‘sign-system’ or the ‘sign,’ should rather concentrate on ‘sign-ness’ 
as its central concept:
But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics 
since it is the abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the 
most general terms, the abstraction of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in 
a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING’S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN 
OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. Th e semantic aspect of 
the problem is expressed in the words ‘to be a sign of something’, the pragmatic 
by ‘to be a sign for someone’, the communicative by ‘to be a sign somewhere’. (Th e 
syntactic aspect is not expressed here, since the concept ‘sign system’ is not being 
considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185 [emphasis original])
Th e hypothesis of this paper depends on the well-recognized fact that intra- and 
interspecifi c boundaries as well as the boundaries of more abstract and/or concrete 
semiotic spaces can never be experientially transgressed, penetrated into and 
comprehended in their totality. Depending on the semiotic subject’s modalities and 
competence with regard to the meaning(s) of a given sign, “the relations [...] are of a 
radically diff erent eidetic type in the logical and the semiotic universes” (Petitot 2004: 
210). Th at is, ‘sign-ness’ in human umwelten is not necessarily ‘sign-ness’ in nature 
1 “Th ey are called “interpretata” since they are dealt with in the process of interpretation, and it 
is to them that the semiosis ultimately relates, although they are oft en “absent” or inaccessible to 
direct perception. However, interpretata can also be imagined objects, such as “unicorns”, which 
are only remotely connected to objects existing outside the organism” (Krampen 1997: 250).
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or other semiotic spaces and vice versa2. Hence, for one sign there must be diff erent 
dimensions of semiosis. Disregarding the syntactic aspect, i.e. sign function and 
theorizing about a single sign by dissecting it onto four categories of existence, each 
will be shown to have its own peculiar semiosic modes or conditions for ‘sign-ness’. 
Th us my aim is to make a point why certain boundaries remain unbreachable.
The fourfold dimension of Representamen, 
(non-)Object and (non-)Interpretant 
Th e semiotic square is suitable for establishing a preliminary typology of relations 
necessary “to distinguish intrinsic features, those which constitute the category, from 
those that are foreign to it” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) with regard to major semiosic 
dimensions. As can be noticed, Pyatigorskij’s defi nition of ‘sign-ness’ echoes Peirce’s 
defi nition of a sign: “[A] sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). In addition to this similarity, the 
triadic sign at its simplest defi nition is commonplace in semiotics, and its elements – 
representamen (R), object (O) and interpretant (I) – are used also in this article.
In general, ‘object’ is anything we can think or talk about. It pays to notice that 
objects do not need to be physical and that the lack of an object would deprive the 
sign of its being a sign, i.e. representamen, at all: “it is a vehicle conveying into the 
mind something from without. Th at for which it stands is called its object; that which 
it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise its interpretant” (CP 1.339).
Signs – according to semiotics – are very real and responsible for reality itself; 
they make their way so that “the interpretant is nothing but another representation to 
which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation 
again” (CP 1.339). Th e infamous infi nite series created in this fashion is halted via 
“ontologization” of the semiotic square thus aff ording semiosistasis and hence, on the 
axis of sub-contraries, instead of calling (Ī) non-interpretant and (Ō) non-object which 
would be in accordance with the inner logic and terminology of the semiotic square, 
we designate (Ī) to point to the absence of interpretation under will and (Ō) to the 
absence of knowledge of objects, though at times the prefi x ‘non-’ is used. However 
unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto the semiotic square.
Th e diagram (Fig. 1) is an adaptation of the semiotic square as presented by Greimas 
and Courtés (1982: 309). In the diagram, representamen (R), or ‘sign-ness’ is placed in 
the middle for the following reasons:
2 Th e semiotic/psychoanalytic tradition of dream analysis and dream interpretation is not 
discussed here. It is not the aim of this paper to say this or that of the formation or interpreted 
meaning of dreams but only of the possible forms of sign as such in four dimensions.
 Four ways of triadic ‘sign-ness’ on two semiotic squares  165
(i)  we, and according to us all other beings, have no access to anything without 
it being (an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and;
(ii)  by extension this argument applies both to nature and culture.
Th e fi rst point concerns the elementary proposition of (anthropo-)semiotics and the 
minimal requirement for something to be interpreted or function as a sign. Here, 
however, there is no function. Th e representamen and its constituents irrespective 
of the dimension discussed are treated as static. Th e second point is that the use of 
the same mark for representamen (R) and ‘sign-ness’ is applicable in all aspects. Th e 
relations, albeit iconically depicted with dissimilar placement of the arrows from those 
of the original, remain the same as the ones shown on the diagram’s legend. Th ere are, 
however, some alterations.
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: relation of contrariety      R: representamen 
        O: object 
: relation of complementarity  I: interpretant 
  N: nature 
: relation of contradiction  C: culture 
        A: awake 
: relation of simple presupposition    Z: asleep  
     
: relation of reciprocal presupposition 
Figure 1. Relations of (R) representing triadic ‘sign-ness’ in four dimensions as projected onto 
the semiotic square.
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First of all, this is not “the visual representation of the logical articulation of any 
semantic category” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) nor exactly does it concern “the 
elementary structure of signifi cation, when defi ned [...] as a relation between at least 
two terms [which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the 
paradigmatic axis of language” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308). Th e latter defi nition is 
somewhat closer to what is being done here; to distinguish ‘dimensions’ of semiosis 
as understood by human cognition, i.e. the elementary mechanisms and functional 
principles of distinct semiotic spaces where we consider signs to be the elements that 
enable activity.
Th is adaptation also strives to off er a supplementation for semiosis as an elementary 
axiological3 structure by example of the triadic sign in order to prepare ground for 
possible future elaborations of abstract categories of value. Th ough excluded at fi rst, it 
may be noted that as a term semiosis is “synonymous with semiotic function” (Greimas, 
Courtés 1982: 285).
On the axis of contraries, object (O) and interpretant (I) are in opposition – 
were it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, then strictly speaking 
the interpretant could never be the object. However, they are both presupposed and 
“can be present concomitantly [...] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety” (Greimas, 
Courtes 1982: 309). In other words, were there no (representations of) objects, the 
interpretations (of representations) would not exist either, although in cases their 
categorial positions are interchangeable.
Including from the middle representamen (R) we fi nd the traditional triad ‘R–O–I’ 
forming a sign, i.e. the utmost minimal requirement for constituting (conscious, 
cognitive) semiosis in the human mind. In our world of awake, there are at least two 
categories of objects – the physically real and the imaginary interpretata. Th at is, as 
animals we are endowed with senses that enable the perception of physical objects and 
as thinking beings we may indulge in musing on the imaginary, creating unicorns and 
like interpretata that are semiotic objects, albeit immaterial in their being. For a person 
to receive a representation of an object, s/he needs to be awake (A) for interpretation 
(I). “In order that an interpretant might emerge, it must enter into interaction with 
some interpreter” (merrell 2013: 28). Th at is, were I unconscious, I would not know I 
(can) think. Th us, by incorporating the awake state (A) we end up with the quadruple 
3 “In semiotics, the term axiology designates the paradigmatic mode of existence of values, in 
contrast to ideology, which assumes the form of their syntagmatic and actantial arrangement. 
[...] Insofar as we are dealing with general categories – which can be considered, as a working 
hypothesis, as semantic universals – that can be articulated according to the semiotic square, a 
distinction can be drawn between elementary axiological structures (of an abstract nature) and 
fi gurative axiological structures.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 21)
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‘R–O–I–A’, which may be said to be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the 
existential whereabouts and semiotic elements by which I know ‘I’ am when awake.
On the positive deixis, there is in addition to the representamen (R), an object (O) 
but there is no interpretant (Ī) in the human sense. As one may infer, the semiotic 
dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (N). Th e lack of freedom for abstract 
endowment of meaning and/or arbitrary interpretation in nature is based on Uexküll’s 
(1982: 28) claim that “because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may 
assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects.” Th is is adopted to 
apply to all of nature; it is only in the human semiotic that “[Th rough] every relationship 
the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is 
imprinted upon it by a subject” (Uexküll 1982: 28). It may be said that in nature, the 
objects’ relations to subjects are limited by their physical being – there are no immaterial 
or imaginary objects, no abstract interpretata in nature.
Th is is not to say that nature (N) would totally lack interpretations, but that it is 
considerably narrower and more restricted when it comes to creating new information 
in this way. Or rather, it is slow to happen within aeons unobservable for the human 
intellect. Allowing this, it may be said that the quadruple ‘R–O–Ī–N’ forms the semiotic 
dimension of beasts and organic matter, including our bodies. It must be noted, 
however, that cultured nature, i.e. biotic and organic matter submitted to human will 
such as fi elds of genetically enhanced crops, cloned livestock and the like, will not be 
considered here, no matter whether they belong to nature or not.
On the negative deixis, we fi nd as proper only interpretation (I) of representation (R) 
but no object (Ō). Th is is based on the presumption that culture (C) – whether seen as 
a semiospheric phenomenon of a mnemonic mechanism or as any other terminological 
construct – cannot with certainty be said to be conscious of its (physical) self through 
senses in order to receive information via or from objects, but only their representations 
interpreted: “Th e history of culture is refl ected as an evolution of interpreting culture – 
on one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the other by next generations, including 
the scientifi c tradition of interpretation” (Lotman 1999: 39; my translation, H. T.).
Culture is to itself simultaneously a subject and an object, neither of which overlaps 
with the other in a single semiosis. For the sake of the argument, physical objects with 
regard to ‘sign-ness’ in culture are treated as elements that from the point of view of 
culture “are not bearers of meaning, as it were do not exist. Th e fact of their actual 
existence recedes to the background in face of their irrelevance in the given modelling 
system. Th ough existing, they as it were cease to exist in the system of culture” (Lotman 
1990: 58).
Excluding the overlapping boundaries and the typology of culture for the sake of 
convenience, culture’s elementary functional mechanism can be said to be interpreting 
itself through representations (of non-objects) within itself, constituting the semiotic 
dimension of culture ‘R–Ō–I–C’; a supra-individual monad of its own rank.
168 Herman Tamminen
On the axis of subcontraries, there is no object (Ō) nor an interpretant (Ī) proper 
but only a representation (R) in and of a physically unreal dimension – dream (Z)4. 
Discussing dreams, Lotman (2009) claims that “the moment a temporary space (the 
pause) between impulse and reaction appeared represented a turning point in the 
history of consciousness” and that this new state of being “requires the development 
and improvement of memory” which, in its turn brought forth “the transformation 
of the reaction to an immediate action into a sign” thus shift ing the orientation to 
reaction from the basic biological schema ‘stimulus – response’ towards information, 
creating “an independent structure capable of assimilation into an ever more complex 
and self-developing mechanism” (Lotman 2009: 142). Th at is, conscious being and 
what followed.
In general, dreaming is “an endogenously mediated perceptual experience occurring 
physiologically during sleep [...] in a format which the dreamer tends to experience 
as a participant rather than a mere observer” (Blom 2010: 157). In other words, the 
Traumwelt5 is a polylingual semiotic space which is immutable by conscious action 
due to nescience of existence6 or, as mutable as mundane reality by will of thought. 
Th e dream “does not immerse us in visual, verbal, musical and other spaces but rather 
in the space of their coalescence which is analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145). 
Th en, duly in a dream, even more so than when awake, “the form of meaning articulates 
a substance which cannot be empirically observed” (Petitot 2004: 191). Regardless, 
the dream becomes known – for us – in retrospect in the awake dimension where it 
intrudes as a memory of and in itself.
“We only know dreams from our memory of them aft er we are awake” (Freud 
1965: 76). Th rough recollection, despite the randomness and diff erent order of things 
than in the accustomed to awake surroundings, the ‘I’ of Traumwelt is still by force of 
circumstance exactly the same as the one you think you are best acquainted with daily, 
only existing in a diff erent reminiscential world than that of awake. “Any act of semiotic 
recognition must involve the separation of signifi cant elements from insignifi cant ones 
in surrounding reality” (Lotman 1990: 58). Analogous to real space and consisting of 
“signs of who knew what, i.e. signs in their pure form” (Lotman 2009: 143), dream may 
be said to form for us a second(ary) sphere of semiotic existence ‘R–Ō–Ī–Z’ in which we 
4 Th ere are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (Z). Firstly, it is presumed that 
in a dream everything may represent something else and secondly, it is visually customary to 
use (Z) to point out that someone is sleeping which is the minimal requirement for dreaming 
proper.
5 From German Traum [‘dream’] + German Welt [‘world’].
6 Occasions of lucid dreaming – dreams in which one knows one is dreaming and can control 
one’s behaviour and environment to an extent – are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/
hypnopompic hallucinations.
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are incapable of action and not aware that ‘I’ exists, or, to say the least, the ‘am’ of ‘I’ is 
diff erent due to diff erent surroundings in a diff erent setting experientially wholly as real.
Th us, we have at least four separate7 semiosic dimensions for ‘sign-ness’ according 
to some very general principles and, as was proposed, the ‘something’s quality of being 
a sign of something for someone in some place’ within each domain is unbreachable 
as the exact same sign from one dimension to the other due to the specifi c qualities of 
the dimensions. Th e four dimensions are, in essence:
that of awake (R–O–I–A), in which conscious (anthropo-) semiosis occurs;
that of nature (R–O–Ī–N), in which organic (bio-) semiosis occurs;
that of culture (R–Ō–I–C), in which inorganic (cultural) semiosis occurs;
that of dream (R–Ō–Ī–Z), in which unaware (oneiric) semiosis occurs.
So far it has been presumed that the presence of elements of a given sign oscillates 
according to ‘sign-ness’ in each of the four dimensions. However, this is not the case 
in the strict sense – especially as regards the lack of interpretation in nature and lack 
of object in culture. It would be somewhat absurd to claim that the triadic sign would 
retain its ‘sign-ness’ or enable semiosis if crippled into a twopartite triadic sign. Indeed, 
if there were no interpretation in nature nor object in culture, evolution in both would 
be excluded. Hence for the sake of clarity, the sign so far has been treated as semiosistatic 
and the proposed lack is not an unconditional one but a purely theoretical one that 
serves to point to the dominant element of semiosis in each dimension. “Th e dominant 
may be defi ned as the focusing component [...] it rules, determines, and transforms the 
remaining components” (Jakobson 1981: 751). More generally in tetralemmic terms, in 
nature the object either is or is not (affi  rmation/negation) for a given subject, whereas 
in culture the object is and is not (equivalence); in dream the object neither is nor is 
not (neither) whereas awake the object’s mode of being depends on the contextual 
situation of a given sign – a discussion which we will not enter here.
Moreover, it may be argued that nature (N) and culture (C) are in a relation of simple 
presupposition – the relation between the presupposing term and the presupposed 
term: “By presupposed term is understood that term, the presence of which is the 
necessary condition for the presence of the presupposing term, while the presence 
of the presupposing term is not the necessary condition for the presupposed term” 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243). Chronologically speaking, culture (C) could not have 
evolved had there been no nature (N), whereas nature does not require the presence 
of culture (C) in order to exist.
7 Granted, nature and culture are interdependent and all dimensions are interconnected in 
human existence, but here they are viewed as distinct for the sake of argument.
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On the other hand, awake (A) and dream (Z) are in a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition, both terms (or dimensions) being simultaneously presupposing and 
presupposed. Th e relation between them as states of consciousness and semioses 
therein is predominantly “either that of combination, on the syntagmatic axis, or that 
of opposition, on the paradigmatic axis” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243), emphasized 
according to the potential assortment of facilitatory forms of meaning or structures 
of consciousness.
In general it may be said that awake semiotic is more syntagmatic, causal and logical; 
dream semiotic is more paradigmatic, random and alogical. Alhough occasions of lucid 
dreaming and the like were excluded above, they may be mentioned here to point to 
the possibility of functional concomitance between dream (Z) and awake (A), i.e. the 
possibility of their co-presence in either state as parts manifest or latently lingering in 
the other aft er the transformation of one state into the other. Th at is, to an extent aware 
cognition may be present in a dream and unaware cognition in reality. Based on the 
subject’s overall knowledge, an individual’s umwelt and Lebenswelt form a Traumwelt 
of which we are aware, as well as of the other dimensions, only by default of our own 
peculiar semiotic mode. It must be noted that in addition to their separate natures, all 
four dimensions are embodied by the human essence; the body is of nature, mind of 
awake, the dream an intersection and culture an extension.
It is also worth noting that remembered dreams are sometimes puzzling and may 
show “an extraordinary persistence in memory” (Freud 1965: 76). Suggestively speaking, 
a core phylogenetic function of this mnemonic translatory cycle may have been to 
bridge the gap between ens realis (body) and (pre-)archaic ens rationis (mind), sealing 
“the structure of the “I” [that] is one of the basic indices of culture” (Lotman 2009: 147).
Being-able-to semiosis
From the point of view of conscious experience, semiosis is an unavoidable semiotic 
mechanism that as a function constitutes sign-action in human cognition and, 
according to some of them, it is responsible for things happening elsewhere as well. 
From the framework of a theory of modalities, the concept of “being-able (to do or to 
be)” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23) is adopted here as an operational term in order to 
clarify the elementary functional natures of the above semiosic dimensions. Th is of 
course requires some clarifi cation and extrapolation of terms.
Modality – in general terms – is that which modifi es the predicate of an utterance8 
whereas modalization is “conceived as the production of a so-called modal utterance, 
8 “[...] we understand utterance to mean any entity endowed with meaning, belonging either 
to spoken strings or to written texts, prior to any linguistic or logical analysis” (Greimas, 
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which over-determines a descriptive utterance” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 193). Not 
delving that much deeper into theory, it may be stated that the most elementary types 
of modal utterances are utterances of doing9 or of state10. Th ey pertain to the dichotomy 
transmogrifi cation/pertuity and “can be found either in the syntactic description of 
descriptive utterances or in the hypertactic description of modal utterances” (Greimas, 
Courtés 1982: 194).
Producing signs, semiosis is an infi nite process of ‘being’ that “serves as copula in 
utterances of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 22). Synonymous with semiotic function, 
semiosis is a doing between two states. Artifi cially frozen as an object of knowledge 
‘being’, both ‘doing’ and ‘state’ are applicable to semiosis, which as a whole can be treated 
as being-able. Th e term “being-able (to do or to be) can be considered as the name of 
one of the possible predicates of the modal utterance governing a descriptive utterance 
of doing or of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23). As such, both possible predicates 
are elementary modal utterances defi nable by their respective transitive aims and by 
this “two modal structures of being-able are to be considered; the one comprises an 
utterance of state and is called for convenience’s sake being-able-to-be; the other has for 
its object an utterance of doing: being-able-to-do” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23). Being-
able-to-do can also be projected onto the semiotic square to bring it into accordance 
with the above dimensions (see Fig. 2). 
being-able-to-do     being-able-not-to-do 
(freedom)      (independence) 
not-being-able-not-to-do    not-being-able-to-do 
(submission)      (powerlessness). 
Figure 2. Being-able-to-do projected onto the semiotic square (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23).
Courtés 1982: 362). Here, utterance is adopted, so that its defi nition extends to the abstract 
category of semiosis as an entity.
9 “As the predicate-function of such an utterance, doing is to be considered, in an 
anthropomorphic syntactic language, as the conversion of the transformation relation.” 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982: 93)
10 “Th e term state can be homologated with that of continuous” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 311). 
According to Greimas and Courtés, “In semiotics, any entity is considered to be continuous 
prior to analysis [...] which, alone, permits the construction of discontinuous or discrete units” 
(Greimas, Courtés 1982: 58).
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To complement the elementary functions of semiosis through being-able-to-do, the 
values of the modal categories as presented above along with the explicated sign-
relations in diff erent dimensions will be shown to defi ne the reach of semiosis as sign-
function in each. In addition, (A) must at points be extended to the concept of ‘alive’ 
and ‘light’, whereas (Z) must at points extend to the concept of ‘dead’ and ‘dark’. Th is 
should not be a far-fetched metaphor. 
In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that what 
is received of a sign by a semiotic entity is its representamen (R). Granted, the way the 
semiotic square has been used so far, it remains a fi rst generation square regardless 
of the positioning of the dimensions being visually similar to the second generation 
of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent, the dimensions belong to diff erent 
semantic and overall semiotic categories. Strictly, (A) and (Z) are two main states of 
consciousness available and comprehensible to all, but, as is obvious, the majority of 
people are part nature (N) part culture (C) and so, however semiosis occurs in either 
or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in consciousness. Allowing this, 
I will now off er a terminological supplementation and by way of a 45o tilt, an extended 
adaptation of the semiotic square as presented in Fig. 3.
? ? ? ???????
? ? ? ? ? ???????? ?? ? ????????????????????????
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? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ?????
? ? ? ? ???????????
? ? ? ? ???????????
?
E g e i r o t h e t i c 
Freedom 
Powerlessness 
O n e i r o t h e t i c 
Submission Independence 
Figure 3. Square on square with dimensions (N/A/C/Z), functional principles (N–Z/C–A) and 
elementary mechanisms (N–A/C–Z) of semiosis along with proposed terminology.
 Four ways of triadic ‘sign-ness’ on two semiotic squares  173
Supplementation and adaptation
Th e four semiosic dimensions abstracted from the semiotic square require in part to 
be re-attached to fi t the tilted square of being-able-to-do. For clarity’s sake, this will 
be done by introducing new terminology with regard to dimensions, their elementary 
mechanisms and functional principles. Unfortunately, only two basic functions will 
be provided: that of nature and that of culture. Th ese dimensions will be treated fi rst 
by dividing each into two before moving on to other propositions.
First, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), 
non-interpretant (Ī) and sleep (Z) constitutes the functional principle of the natural 
world ‘N–Z’, which is based on non-interpretations of (representations of) objects. It is 
void of conscious freedom of choice and all semiosis functions on an ‘as-is’ principle, 
leading nature to wherever she may evolve. Th e outcome of semioses unstressed 
by consciousness or volition may be called thesisaorist11. Th is is to emphasize the 
unstressed nature of semiosis in nature that is evident as the absence of interpretation 
as we understand it as well as to point to the fact that nature pre-dates all conscious 
being and is of undefi ned duration as such. By collocating this with the triangle formed 
by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), object (O) and awake (A), 
where the phenomenal, living natural world ‘N–A’ resides and in which (bio-)semioses 
happen – within the object of nature without the possibility of interpreting itself as 
something else – the elementary semiotic mechanism can be said to be autophaneric12. 
Th is is to point to the ‘automatic’, inner functioning of nature in the sense that growth 
of plants and animals – evolution – happens by and in itself as the biological functions 
happening inside each organism show; each body of organic matter grows old and dies 
like celestial bodies.
In short, thesisaorist semiosis is an unstressed function, there is no guiding thought 
or consciousness, and it takes place in the dimension of nature. Th e (unguided) function 
of thesisaorist semiosis is autophaneric in that as a mechanism it represents objects of 
itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding conscious interpretation. From the 45o 
tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential 
11 Th esis + aorist; from ‘thesis’ (prosody): an unstressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in 
Greek or Latin verse; from ‘aorist’ (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb 
(especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the 
action.
12 Auto + phaneros; from Greek ‘automatos’ (‘acting of itself ’) from autos (‘self ’); from Greek 
phaneros (‘visible, manifest’). Here it is useful to call to mind Peirce’s phaneron, “the collective 
total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it 
corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP 1.284). Here, the phaneron is moved from the mind 
to the sphere of material nature/evolution and the ‘visible’ or ‘bringing-to-view’ of phaneros 
should be understood as ‘manifest’ or ‘cause-to-appear’.
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of ‘sign-ness’ in thesisaorist autophaneric semioses is restricted according to the value of 
the modal category not-being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of submission 
due to the lack of free interpretation. Th at is, natural beings take their natural habitat 
as natural, where there is no need (or possibility) for grand change.
Second, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture 
(C), interpretant (I) and awake (A) constitutes the phenomenal cultural world ‘C–A’, 
the functional principle of which is based on interpretation alone and all semiosis 
functions on an ‘is-as’ principle, leading culture to wherever it may evolve. Th e outcome 
of semioses stressed by consciousness or volition (by way of humans) may be called 
Arsisaorist13. Th is to emphasize the stressed nature of semiosis in culture in the sense 
that everything in culture is artifi cial, objectivated matter carrying on interpretation 
but knowing no objects. Each object was, and has the potential to be, something else, 
hence there is no need to know them, only their interpretations. It also points to the 
pre-dating and indefi nite duration of culture, albeit from a species-specifi c human point 
of view. Everybody is born into a culture. By collocating this with the triangle formed 
by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture (C), non-object (Ō) and sleep 
(Z), there lay the elementary semiotic mechanism of culture, ‘C–Z’. Cultural semioses 
happen within culture without the knowledge of objects, distorting interpretations 
indefi nitely, and can be said to be sciautomatic14. As the reasons for absence of 
knowledge of objects indicate: culture is immaterial and inanimate matter, it may be 
said to function as deaf, dumb, and blind automatically without senses, facilitating 
only interpretation of meaning.
In short, arsisaorist semiosis is a stressed function, there is a guiding thought derived 
from consciousness (regardless that signs and/or interpretations of objects may take 
on a ‘life’ of their own, they have been instigated by someone) and it takes place in the 
dimension of culture. Th e (guided) function of arsisaorist semiosis is a sciautomatic 
mechanism in that it interprets representations of itself to itself by itself and in itself, 
excluding objects; unaware of what it consists of. From the 45o tilted point of view 
of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential of ‘sign-ness’ in 
arsisaorist sciautomatic semioses is restricted according to the value of the modal 
category being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of independence due to the 
lack of objects, which in themselves are not essential to their being. Th at is, if culture 
adopts a new interpretation, it discards the object and the process of interpretation 
cannot be shut down by any means.
13 Arsis + aorist; from arsis (prosody): a stressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or 
Latin verse; from aorist (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in 
Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action.
14 Scia + automatic; from Greek skia (‘shadow’); from Greek automatos (‘acting by itself ’).
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To put it in an ideational manner: thesisaorist autophaneric semiosis corresponds 
to randmoness, light, rebirth and continuity, whereas arsisaorist sciautomatic semiosis 
corresponds to plannedness, darkness, death and discreteness. For the remaining two 
dimensions, it is useful to keep in mind the English word ‘thesis’ (‘a statement or theory 
put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved’).
Following the metatheoretical lines of consciousness as presented by Mamardashvili 
and Pyatigorskij (2011), I argue that all and each consciousness is situated in the sphere 
of consciousness, which possesses neither a spatial nor a temporal defi nition; it is 
‘where’ each consciousness is situated pragmatically, yet not statically. It is the state(s) 
of consciousness in which there is a correspondence for each notional construct with 
the subject’s given psychic state as a structure or content of consciousness. States of 
consciousness are in themselves empty, though not as the opposition of form and 
content; a state of consciousness is not the antithesis of content in relation to it. Th at is, 
absence of thought does not entail absence of consciousness, which can exist without 
conscious thought.
Th at said, the semiotic activity and volition of human consciousness with regard to 
cognition, ‘A’ along with its constituent parts facilitate the sphere of conscious thought 
and acknowledged existence and may be said to be egeirothetic15. Th at is, consciousness 
is in an awake state that facilitates the structure ‘I’ and what follows, thus being capable 
of action at will. In the strict sense, all information from both culture (C) and nature 
(N) as well as from dream (Z) fall under this semiosic category as objects of knowledge. 
Instead of existing in the noumenal world of Ding an sich’s, we know of them and of 
everything else only through signs or through our memories of them, which, of course, 
are also signs, hence the absence of a specifi c function to this dimension. From the 45o 
tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued however that to an extent, the 
functional potential in egeirothetic semiosis as conscious thought and action by volition 
is restricted according to the value of the modal category being-able-to-do, i.e. semiosis 
is in a position of freedom due to the presence of ‘sign-ness’ in its totality. Everything 
there is to know can be known to the extent that signs can be known.
Th e also familiar lower-half ‘Z’ and its parts facilitate dreaming and unconscious 
thought in the sphere of consciousness and may be said to be oneirothetic16. Th ough 
dreaming occurs in the sphere of consciousness, the ‘I’ dreamt therein does not facilitate 
an identical ‘I’ to that of the mundane awake as a state, structure nor fact or content of 
consciousness. Granted, sometimes there is some degree of awareness or sense of self 
in a dream but in general it may be said that whilst dreaming, ‘I’ am not aware that I 
am dreaming. Indeed, only in reality do we suspect whether it is actual. ‘I’ is as is the 
15 Egeiro + thetic; from Greek egeiro (‘to waken, to raise up’); from Greek thesis (‘placing, a 
proposition’).
16 Oneiro + thetic; from Greek oneiros (‘dream’); from Greek thesis (‘placing, a proposition’).
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dream – unreal. A dreamer cannot decide the content of dreams nor am ‘I’ able to stop 
thoughts from appearing or the mind from wandering.17
As regards dreams, the gist of the matter is that the majority of representations 
or knowledge of them in this dimension become known to us only in retrospect. In 
general, reminiscing can take place only aft erwards. It is categorically impossible to 
indulge oneself in the recollection of past events when they have not yet come to 
pass, or in the case of dreams, not yet ended. A dream is a memory in both senses of 
the word. As was pointed out, we ‘know dreams from our memory of them aft er we 
are awake,’ and also – excluding lucid dreaming – ‘I’ either does not exist as a mental 
construct or to say the least, it is wholly diff erent by way of being in accordance with 
the Traumwelt, rather than the mundane reality. Were there reminiscing in a dream, 
it is part of the dream itself, in the ‘present’ of the Traumwelt that – in a sense – has 
nothing to do with reality. Dreams are not ‘real’ in the sense that they would exist so to 
say nor do they necessarily have an equivalent in reality; they are just dreams. And yet, 
as is known, dreams do serve a purpose in our existence, as for example strengthening 
and/or weakening memory and by this working through the whole ‘I’ and forming it 
in the process. From the 45o tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued 
that to an extent, the functional potential of ‘sign-ness’ in oneirothetic semiosis is 
restricted according to the value of the modal category not-being-able-to-do, i.e. semiosis 
is in a position of powerlessness due to the lack of both object and interpretant, the 
representations of which are known to us only by memory.
Conclusion
In conclusion, mandala-vandalization of the semiotic square by placing one on top of 
the other has yielded a fairly wholesome picture of the quadruple dimensional nature 
of semiosis according to the triadic relations of ‘sign-ness’ in each. Th e values of modal 
categories restricting semiosis, its main ‘states’ and ‘doings’ in two parallel dimensions 
(N/C), have been brought to view and are by extension applicable to the remaining 
two (A/Z) to support the central argument.
Th e fi rst adaptation of the semiotic square in which the dimensions of semiosis 
were explicated, supports the existence and diff erence in characters of these dimensions 
more clearly by explicating their respective sign-relations and the nature of ‘sign-ness’.
17 Th is faintly echoes Peirce’s Musement: “It begins passively enough with drinking in the 
impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into 
attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion 
between self and self. If one’s observations and refl ections are allowed to specialize themselves 
too much, the Play will be converted into scientifi c study; and that cannot be pursued in odd 
half hours” (CP 6.459).
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Secondly, what we perceive of the world – whether that of nature or of culture – 
we perceive only the manifest outcome via signs, not the latent reason or function. 
As was shown, thesisaorist and arsisaorist semiosis are (non-)interpretations – the 
‘doing’ if one pleases – that defi ne and in part are the overall functional principles 
in their respective dimensions; nature is non-interpretative and culture is nothing 
but interpretation. Autophaneric and sciautomatic in their turn are the more-or-less 
material outcomes – ‘state’ – that facilitate the primary functional principles in their 
respective dimensions as elementary semiotic mechanisms; nature as an object of 
submission in and to herself and culture as an independent non-object in and of itself. 
In their respective dimensions they correspond to the latent function and manifest 
form or, the unseen and seen of nature and culture. In short, thesisaorist-autophaneric 
semiosis is object in submission to non-interpretation, whereas arsisaorist-sciautomatic 
semiosis is interpretation independent of objects.
Th irdly, egeirothetic semiosis – our daily semiotic reality consisting in part of nature 
and in part of culture encompassing both of the above dimensions in the body and 
mind (where to place ‘spirit’ is a diff erent question) – was shown to function in full 
extent with regard to ‘sign-ness.’ Th e relations of signs and knowledge of separable 
dimensions of semiosis ironically captivates the intellect into its own distinct dimension. 
As such, it positions dream (and dreaming) – oneirothetic semiosis – as analogous and 
into a similar opposition as those of nature’s functional principle (N/Z) and culture’s 
elementary mechanism (C/Z) with regard to their counterparts due to the lack of 
both object and interpretation. Our cognition may be argued to be based partially on 
dreams of which we are not aware while dreaming and partially on dreams known 
from memory – a ‘doing’ and a ‘state’ as understood awake. 
Or, expressed in terms introduced in this article – on the basis of our bodies being 
natural organisms and on the analogous structure and function of the human intellect 
and culture – a part of our consciousness and by extension cognition is based on known 
dreams that are an autophaneric-arsisaorist ‘state’ in egeirothetic reality, and a part 
on dreaming as such that is a thesisaorist-sciautomatic ‘doing’ in oneirothetic reality 
and, as was proposed, they may be functionally concomitant. Th e former inevitably 
requires translation, because it is the result of the latter – an unknown language – and 
by this lifelong cycle of strengthening/weakening a mnemonic consciousness, parts of 
the world’s meanings are put to place.
Among other things, what separates human from beast is doubt – at some point 
the nature of reality and the realness of natural objects therein became dubious for our 
species and this dubiety was based upon the primordial, hesitant interpretation of the 
seemingly praeternatural in its surroundings that bursted into abstract existence, into 
thought by way of dreams. Confronted with something uncanny in its surroundings, 
the archaic, nigh-animal mind had every reason to suspect s/he was in a dream – or 
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that the dream was in reality – which led to a semiotic experiment in both dimensions. 
If it is what it seems to be as in nature and as in a dream – awareness of the latter 
enabling the possibility for it not to be what it seems to be; it could be or the very least 
it can be made to be something it is not – a cultural object. In short, the transit from 
nature to culture, from semiosic submission to independence required development 
and improvement of memory achieved by way of dream and semiosic powerlessness 
therein which aided transforming the immediate ‘stimulus-response’ reaction into a 
sign awake; into freedom.
Th is leads to suggest that what photosynthesis is to plants or what metabolism is to 
animals; what continuance and unpredictability are to culture – dreams and dreaming 
are their equivalent to compos mentis in human beings. Th e last trait is derived from 
consciousness, and considering its alleged changes during our phylogenesis along with 
the fact that we as natural beings are a product of evolution, it may be argued that 
consciousness as such should not be restricted within the boundaries of human fl esh 
alone.
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Четыре возможности представления триадической «знаковости» 
в двух семиотических квадратах
В статье рассматривается семиозис и его измерения как теоретическая конструкция, чтобы 
показать некоторые элементарные различия между сферами семиотического действия. 
По сути знак будет разделен на четыре категории существования, чтобы показать, что он 
может иметь разные отношения в зависимости от того, в каком измерении он находится. 
Основной рамкой, вместе с тем, является человеческое сознание в его двух состояниях: 
в состоянии бодрствования и сна со сновидениями, с акцентом на последнее. Несмотря 
на широкое использование универсальных понятий ‘природа’ и ‘культура’, статья не 
сосредоточивается на семиотических особенностях этих доменов. С нашей точки зрения 
‘природа’ и ‘культура’ имеют два уровня, т.е. проявленную форму и скрытую функцию, 
видимое и невидимое. Они используются параллельно, поддерживая центральный тезис 
этой статьи о том, что человеческое познание имеет соответствие в виде сновидения.
Теоретическая рамка взята из работы Греймаса и Курте с акцентом на семиотический 
квадрат. Понятие знака трактуется в духе Пирса, тогда как понятие «знаковости» дается 
по Пятигорскому. При проекции триадического знака на семиотический квадрат 
и исключении понятия «знаковой системы» вместе с синтаксическим аспектом, 
обнаруживается основное четырехкратное измерение знака, опирающаяся на 
определенные знаковые отношения в каждом данном измерении. Чтобы удвоить квадрат, 
семиозис будет наделен функцией «быть способным», таким образом обеспечивая 
начальное выражение доминирующих модальностей, служащих в каждом из четырых 
измерений основой для структуры (структур) элементарной функции и механизма. Это 
также даст возможность рассмотреть некоторые элементарные ограничения семиозиса в 
каждом из измерений. Наконец, предлагаются некоторые новые термины в соответствии 
с тем, что было представлено.
Triaadilise ‘märgilisuse’ neli võimalust kahel semiootilisel ruudul
Artikkel tegeleb semioosi ja selle mõõtmetega kui teoreetilise konstruktsiooniga, et 
demonstreerida mõningaid elementaarseid erinevusi semiootilise tegevuse sfäärides. Sisuliselt 
lahatakse üks märk neljaks eksistentsikategooriaks, näitamaks, et sel võivad olla erinevad suhted 
olenevalt mõõtmest, milles see olema juhtub. Üldiseks raamiks on inimteadvus ja selle kaks 
eristuvat olekut: ärkvelolek ja uni, rõhuasetusega viimasel. Vaatamata universaalsete terminite 
nagu ‘loodus’ ja ‘kultuur’ ohtrale kasutamisele, ei tegele käesolev artikkel nende valdkondade 
semiootiliste eripäradega. Meie seisukohast on ‘loodusel’ ja ‘kultuuril’ kaks kihti – manifestne 
vorm ja latentne funktsioon, nähtav ja nähtamatu. Neid vaadeldakse paralleelselt, et toetada 
käesoleva artikli keskset teesi, et inimkognitsiooni vasteks on unenägemine.
Peamine teoreetiline raam tuleneb Greimase ja Courtés’ töödest, rõhuasetusega semiootilisele 
ruudule. Märgi mõiste võetakse Peirce’ilt ning “märgilisus” Pjatigorskilt. Projitseerides triaadilist 
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märki semiootilisele ruudule ning välistades ‘märgisüsteemi’ mõiste koos süntaktilise aspektiga, 
tuuakse nähtavale märgi neljakordne alusdimensioon, mis tugineb kindlatele märgisuhetele 
igas antud mõõtmes. Et ruutu kahekordistada, antakse semioosile ‘suutlikkuse’ jooned, lubades 
domineerivate modaalsuste algset väljendumist, mis igas neljast dimensioonist toimivad 
elementaarse funktsiooni struktuuri(de) ja mehhanismi alusena. See võimaldab vaatluse alla 
tuua ka mõned elementaarsed piirangud semioosile iga dimensioonis. Viimaks pakutakse välja 
mõned uued terminid.
